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If a transfer has been made which will benefit others upon
the death of the transferor, it is taxable.26  This principle has
been applied in cases involving commercial and private pension
plan annuities.2 7
In a recent case, decedent, a member of the New York City
employee's retirement system, made an irrevocable election of an
"option" which reduced his retirement benefits and gave his wife
an annuity for life in the event that she survived him. A unani-
mous court held the value of the annuity to be taxable to dece-
dent's estate. 8
The instant situation was analogized to commercial annuities,
the court finding that in effect decedent had purchased a joint
and survivorship annuity i. e. a transfer to take effect in possession
or enjoyment on his death.
It was held that the value of the gift to the widow is to be
determined by formulae pursuant to Tax Law § 249-v.29
A claim, upheld by the Surrogate, ° that Article XVI, Section
5 of the New York Constitution31 forbids estate taxation of "pen-
sions" was rejected on the ground that the Constitution refers to
income taxes only.
Wroigful Death Actions
a. Distribution: Section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation
Law provides that if an employee be injured under circumstances
entitling him to compensation through the wrongful act of an-
other, not in the same employ, he or in the case of death, his
dependents, may accept workmen's compensation and commence
an action against the third party wrongdoer. If the judgment
recovered is greater than the compensation payable, the com-
pensation carrier is entitled to reimbursement therefrom. If the
recovery is less than the compensation payable the claimant is
entitled to deficiency payments from the employer or the insur-
ance carrier.
26. Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701 (1949); Commissioner v.
Church's Estate, 335 U. S. 632 (1949) ; Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1939).
27. Mearkle's Estate v. Commissioner, 129 F. 2d 386 (3d Cir. 1942); Commis-
sioner v. Clise, 122 F. 2d 998 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 315 U. S. 821 (1941); Commis-
sioner v. Wilder's Estate, 118 F. 2d 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 634 (1941).
28. In re Endemann's Estate, 307 N.Y. 100, 120 N.E. 2d 514 (1954).
29. The Appellate Division had made an independent computation based on the
"actual value" of the gift. This was determined by the decrease in the "initial reserve"
fund in the pension records for decedent's own benefits, due to his electing the annuity
option. 282 App. Div. 768, 122 N.Y. S. 2d 682 (2d Dep't 1953).
30. 201 Misc. 1077, 106 N.Y. S. 2d 849 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
31. § 5 "All salaries, wages and other compensation, except pensions, paid to of-
ficers and employees of the state and its subdivisions and agencies shall be subject to
taxation". [Emphasis added].
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Section 133 of the Decedent Esftate Law provides for distribu-
tion of the proceeds of a wrongful death action as follows: "The
damages recovered in an action . ..are exclusively for the benefit
of the decedent's husband or wife, and next of kin . . .and when
they are collected, they must be distributed by the plaintiff, or
representative, to any or all of such husband or wife and next of
kin, in proportion to the pecuniary injuries suffered . . ." [Em-
phasis added.]
In Gross v. Abraham,2 plaintiff's husband was injured by the
negligence of the defendafit, not his employer, and consequently
died. Plaintiff brought an action for wrongful death and re-
covered $10,500 in damages. An application was made pursuant
to Section 133, and the damages were apportioned 85% to the
plaintiff and 15% to the decedent's son, an adult who was gain-
fully employed. He testified that his mother and father lived with
him rent free, that his father did certain jobs around the house
and as a result of the loss of his services he suffered pecuniary
damages to the extent of $10.00 per week. The insurance carrier
contends that unless a child, minor or adult, is financially de-
pendent on the continued life of the parent he cannot share in the
proceeds recovered in an action for wrongful death. Consequently
the amount awarded to the son should be repaid to the plaintiff
and the deficiency correspondingly reduced, since the son is not a
dependent within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation
Law.
The court held that the onlv major reauirements of Section
133 are, first, that the person claiming a share of the proceeds be
a member of the class of next of kin as defined by law and, second,
that they demonstrate a pecuniary loss or injury so that it may be
determined what. proportion of the proceeds should be awarded
them. The court said that there i- nothinz in Section 133 which.
reanires that the next of kin be dependent on the decedent as a
condition to his sharing in the damages for wrongful death and
therefore the proceeds were properly apportioned.33
b. Notice of claim against municipalities: The Decedent
Estate Law Section 130, provides that on admiistrator may
maintain an action for the wrongful death of his intestate pro-
vided it is commenced within two years from the date of death.
This action can only be brought by the legal representative, not
by the surviving spouse or next of kin.3 4 Where an action is
32. 306 N.Y. 525° 119 N.E. 2d 370 (1954).
33. See Tilley v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 471, 474 (1862) ; McIntyre v.
New York Central R. R. Co., 37 N.Y. 287, 295-296 (1867).
34. Siso v. Kliner, 185 Misc. 154, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 219 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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commenced prior to the granting of letters of administration it is
void and not rendered valid by subsequent appointment.3 5
In a recent case3" plaintiff, one of decedent's next of kin,
filed a notice of claim for wrongful death against the City of Mt.
Vernon within the ninety day time limit provided by General
Municipal Law Section 50-e. At that time plaintiff had not been
appointed administratrix of the estate. Subsequently, and within
the ninety day period, she was so appointed. The city moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a
cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the notice of claim
so as to include herself as administratrix. 37 The trial court in its
discretion granted plaintiff's motion. The Appellate Division in
reversing the trial court relied on Crapo v. City of Syracuse,8
and held that as the plaintiff had not been appointed administra-
trix at the time of the filing of the notice of claim it was a com-
plete nullity. 9
The Court of Appeals -held that under the existing law an
amendment is allowed but remanded the case to the Appellate
Division to ascertain whether the trial court abused its discretion,
a point which they had not passed on. The court based its de-
cision on the fact that Section 50-e does not require that an
executor or administrator be appointed before a notice of claim
be filed and since there is no statutory prohibition, the next of kin
themselves should be permitted to file a notice, even though a suit
on the claim could not be brought until an administrator had been
appointed. 0 In addition they stated that the primary purpose of
Section 50-e is to give municipalities prompt notice of claims so
that investigations may be made.4' Here that purpose has been
fulfilled.
The court distinguished the Crapo ease, which held that the
cause of action for wrongful death does not accrue until the ap-
pointment of an administrator. This case arose many years ago
under a charter provision which required that notice of intention
to commence a wrongful death action and the time and place of
the accident had to be filed within six months after the accrual
of the cause action and commencement of the suit had to be within
35. Smith v. New York Central R. R. Co.,. 183 App. Div. 478, 171 N.Y. Supp.
64 (2nd Dep't 1918).
36. Winbush v. City of Mount Vernon et al., 306 N.Y. 327, 118 N.E. 2d 459(1954).37. See GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW § 50-e (6).
38. 183 N. Y. 395, 76 N. E. 465 (1906).
39. 282 App. Div. 749, 123 N. Y. S. 2d 301 (2d Dep't 1953).
40. DECEDENT ESTATE LAv § 130.
41. See Charlemagne v. City of New York, 277 App. Div. 689, 102 N.Y. S. 2d
661 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd, 302 N. Y. 871, 100 N. E. 2d 52 (1951).
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one year after accrual. The executor was not appointed until
sixteen months had elapsed but he filed his notice of intention
within two months and commenced the action within five months
of his appointment. His claim was also filed within the two year
limit afforded by Decedent Estate Law Section 130.
The court in the instant case said:
The Syracuse statute required the filing of a claim within
six months 'after the cause of action shall have accrued' where-
as our section 50-e requires filing within 'ninety days after the
claim arises'. In the Crapo case, the claim which the statute
demanded had to contain not only a statement of the facts
of the accident, but notice also of intention to bring a suit, and
it was held that, since only an administratrix could bring the
suit, only an administratrix could give notice of intention
to sue, and so the time for filing the claim did not start to
run until the administratrix was appointed. The present
claim, however, was preliminary to suit under section 130 of
the Decedent Estate Law, as to which it has been specifically
held that the time runs from death, and we have, also, section
50-e itself, which requires filing of the claim within ninet, days
'after the claim arises'. The Crapo decision is no authority
against our holding here .... [Emphasis added.]
It is the opinion of this writer that the holding of the instant
case Will be strictly confined to its facts and will not be applicable
to the filing of wrongful death claims in general.
VII. DOiESTic RELATIoNs
Separation Agreements
The Court of Appeals this term has, in two cases,' ruled
that a wife is entitled to the full amount stated in a separation
agreement for the support of herself and her children where the
amount stated is unitary and unallocated between herself and the
children and, through no fault of hers, she is no longer support-
ing the children.
The fundamental rule of contracts that a court, as a matter
of law, will look only to the agreement to find intent in an un-
ambiguous contract,2 has always been applied to separation agree-
ments.3 Courts have refused to apportion the total amount
allocated for the support of the wife and the children where the
1. Nichols v. Nichols, 306 N.Y. 490, 119 N.E. 2d 351 (1953); Rehill v. Rehill,
306 N.Y. 126, 116 N.E. 2d 281 (1953).
2. Brainard v. New York Ccnt. R. Co., 242 N. Y. 125, 133 N. E. 152 (1926).
3. Galusha v. Galusha, 116 N.Y. 635, 22 N.E. 1114 (1889) ; Goldman v. Goldinats,
282 N. Y. 296, 26 N. E. 2d 265 (19401.
